No problem - I understood that you referred to the Senate. Yes, special elections are rare - but that's why I put that (rare) situation in a hypothetical example, to clarify how "regional" elections can have important effects on national government. Perhaps another illustrative example of such an effect, albeit evidently not tied to the legislative side, is (clearly ignoring this year's highly unusual protracted Democratic primaries) the preponderance of Eastern states on the Presidential candidacies of both parties. Either way, it's neither exclusive to (Western) European countries, nor even that unusual to see regional politics getting somehow stubbornly in the way of national politics.

However, when you say: "one of the main weaknesses of a parliamentary democracy is the lack of local accountability and the demands placed on the office holder by his party" I'm afraid you've lost me. It seems you've either scrambled the parliamentary system (referring to a national body) with local government; alternatively, you'd imply that there's no "district tie" between an elected official and the pertaining electorate.

Neither is true. In the latter case, it's important to note that there is no homogeneous system. Therefore, while there are countries that have a unified (national) ballot, it's certainly not a rule of thumb. Secondly, Senates oftentimes fulfill such a (strengthened) role representative of districts or regions - but again, it's not a uniform system. And not all parliamentary systems have a "direct" suffrage of Senators (via ballots per district) as, for an interesting example, the Netherlands has a system of indirect elections for the Senate, where elected members of each provincial assembly in turn elect "their" senators.

But finally, you also overlook the preponderance of coalitions in Europe, a phenomenon which is a natural albeit not foolproof antidote against party clientelism (a.k.a. a spoiler system in the US), and reduces opportunities for such a government (cabinet) member beholden to "excessive" party influences. Government coalitions imply government pacts among several parties, resulting in a governance plan ("agenda") that is previously negotiated and agreed upon. This is why the process of government formation can be such a complicated and protracted thing in some countries. But it results in a strongly diminished "grip" of a party on "its" government member - posturing and "unforeseen issues" aside.

Either way, and without wanting to go deeper into it, there are typically several institutional firewalls in place to avoid on the one hand that a minority party can wield excessive leverage, and on the other foment a more constructive engagement of parties that entered the coalition. Of course, there are plenty of exceptions that go against this general "rule".

It's true, overall, that parliamentary accountability of the executive (of the government leader and his/her cabinet members, both "full portfolio" ministers and "junior ministers" or secretaries of state as they're often called; in the US, deputy secretaries) can lead to proverbial banana peel encounters along the road. But the high visibility of such parliamentary "political impeachment" proceedings (i.e., a vote of no confidence) also compensates the representativity toward the electorate; a party that gingerly and merrily sends a cabinet home will inexorably face the electoral consequences.

But I don't want to digress too much into detailed comparisons - my point is simply to indicate my impression that your critique responds to a fairly broadly existing lack of understanding in the US of how parliamentary systems work, especially in Europe, with all the ensuing misconceptions (not to mention strange caricatures!), on the other hand notwithstanding the equal and corollary truth of a disconcerting lack of understanding of how the system in the US works, sadly prevailing on the other side of the Atlantic.

Again, such different manifestations of different traditions don't warrant an implication of a fundamental difference in essential, underlying common intent: keeping the players of the game honest and accountable to the electorate.

(I'm sorry I got carried away... I'm typing between sessions, and it just kept growing and growing - kudos for your patience if you manage to read through it!)

Well, first of all: this topic is about NATO, incidentally grounded in the United Nations, so your comparison with the air campaigns against FYR and its clear UNSC mandate seems to defuse itself. Besides, I think the reams of unilateral declarations of executive privilege (e.g. in denying appearances before Congress hearings, or in cloaking decision making in a thick fog of secrecy) make a comparison with especially the Clinton administrations a doomed endeavor for your argument. To be sure, I'm not arguing the intrinsic aspects of (for example) the Clinton policies, but from a formal / institutional point of view, any reasonable comparison with the Bush (#43) administration would prove you wrong in denying a spike in claims of executive privilege, compared to any administration from Carter (i.e. post-Nixon) through today.

But now about your observations on European political / institutional tradition and its democratic credentials...

I'm not sure what you're looking at when you refer to "every war Europe engaged in in the 20th century." I deliberately dated the headstone for de facto absolutism in 1918, more precisely: the end of WWI. That is when heads of state in Western Europe abrogated their "executive privilege." And I specifically mentioned the incredibly brutal resurgence at the hand of fascists in Italy, Germany and Spain (in chronological order) as key exceptions, although I'm quite confident that Greek and Portuguese readers of AR would have no problem in reminding us of pertinent other cases. Of course, that's still Western Europe; in Eastern and Central Europe, there's definitely the factor of powers unleashed after the sudden release from Soviet oppression and the subsequent vacuum; most notably, in FYR. But I honestly have no idea what else you're referring to with "every war Europe engaged in" in the context of Western Europe.

By the way, I seriously hope I'm not wrong by discounting the last throes of post-colonialism (e.g. Indonesia, Indochina, Algeria, Suez...) from your consideration here, because there's very little there to allow for a connection with "absolutism" in the sense we're discussing here.

Interestingly, you say "running over the will of the majority 'for their own good'" and then go on to mention some presumed instances of such. So I'll play along with your order:

*) VAT: that is the equivalent of ye olde Sales Tax in the US, and is accorded as a financing tool for what today is the EU. Precisely to avoid opaque situations that would easily arise from funding through income-related taxes, the introduction of sales taxes were a straightforward and practical means, and have been proven quite effective. Of course, in some countries the "newly introduced" VAT has tempted politicians beyond resistance so as to pad the national public coffers some more, but that's a different issue that cannot be attributed to the phenomenon or principle of levying a sales tax by itself.

*) Capital punishment: after WWII, and the inevitable wave of "settled scores" in its wake, the recent, burning and intensely shameful realization of the consequences of allowing a state to subsume the fundamental right to take a life rang quite medieval. That is why there was broadly consensus, hardly a political issue, in taking capital punishment out of the criminal system. It's true that phenomena like mass immigration and others, such as on account of "globalization," have led to an impression among many of a "soft" criminal system. But if you look at the underlying fundamentals, the occasional appearance of claims to return to capital punishment is more of a claim for stiffer sentencing (i.e. longer jail terms for certain crimes) rather than reflective of any considerable group of citizens. The death penalty is dead, dead, dead in Europe.
*) EU accession: if you truly believe that a majority of any current EU member favors stepping out, I'd appreciate its specific mention. Not even in archetypal Euroskeptic Britain will you find a majority in favor of leaving the EU. Something else is the degree of comfort with the current situation, but that's why there's a lengthy, arduous and highly complex debate going on, precisely to remedy that. It's preposterous to either claim that there's been a "majority" in a country that opposed accession and yet acceded, or that such a majority arose after accession and the country remained an EU member; I challenge you to provide such a case.

Now, onto a deeper aspect of your claims: you appear to deny the socio political representativity of parties and social pressure groups (lobbies, NGOs, etc.). I suppose it's fair to state that each party / pressure group doesn't encapsulate a social majority - the only significant example that comes to mind is Solidarnos (Solidarity) in Poland, during its years as a Soviet proxy. So yeah, in Western Europe parties and social pressure groups do represent "special interests." Guess what: that's true democracy at work, right there. Unlike other systems that have but two flavors to choose from, which presume with a straight face to represent the whole spectrum of opinions, such a "fractured" representation much more accurately represents such shades of socio political orientation. And wherever a government is deemed as yielding "too much" to a given group, elections set them straight very quickly.

For some reason you appear to believe that governmental policy models that are consensus-seeking are (practically / typically) limited to Scandinavian countries. That's yet another interesting yet very typical preconceived notion. You're probably not so much familiar with recent Spanish political history, but I submit that that's just as much a phenomenal example of consensus seeking to build up (reinvent) a parliamentary representative democracy. I'm not denying that there are many excellent things to be found in Northern European countries; I'm simply denying that there's nothing exclusive going on there toward either "governability" (i.e., the degree to which efforts are successful to implementing effective government policies) or "representativity". Again, that's but a tired, old caricature living beyond reality.

Finally, about parliamentary elections and resulting governments. True: in many countries you see "closed" lists. However, you see many more "feasible" lists on the ballot than you see in the US and its (again) all but two options. More importantly, parties in Europe have a much stronger ideological foundation than a stifling two-party system could afford. So, in Europe there's usually a choice among policies instead of (rather artificial) choices of puppets / people. Besides, the party leader of the most voted list (where applicable, of the government coalition) is almost naturally the next Prime Minister; most decidedly that's democratic, most naturally, that's decided by the voters.

Precisely because politics in Europe is much more about the ideological approach of politics (the "res publica") than the rather superficial affability (or beer-drinking buddy potential) of specifically Presidential candidates in the US. Given the hardly fleshed-out political programs ("planks") in the US, and by comparison, the choice among the most fetching / charming candidate doesn't exactly place the specific purpose of the candidates (namely: qualifications and sound feasibility of plans proposed) any service. Again: it's an interesting but fantastic caricature that which you portray.

Having said all that: I'm not trying to hold up the goodness of the proverbial "Western European political / institutional system" (which doesn't exist as such, beyond the common EU) as something to copy, let along as something that's to be implemented in the US. In Europe, the European traditions make eminent sense, and they work. Not too coincidentally, I believe that electoral participation (as the percentage of eligible voters) bears that points out; compare that with the appalling low figures in the US. However, just as well does the system in use (for centuries now!) in the US make eminent sense, here too (because I live in the US now). In its own context, each system makes sense. It's not only absurd and patently disprovable to seek "superiority" in each of the two traditions; it's all the more reason to redouble efforts to break down such pathetic misconceptions and work toward mutual understanding. From there onward, reasonable, durable and truly profitable consensus will ensue, e.g. on the issue at hand - Afghanistan.

While that's an understandable analysis, it does align with those who are wary of a NATO serving the US' national interests.

The key here is to move past narrow interpretations, and find common ground. If that common ground - which exists, no doubt - and shared interests are aligned more intelligently, and mechanisms are devised to avoid that NATO is (mis)treated like a "foreign extension" of national policy, there's more than enough reason for optimism.

If not, I'm sure NATO will be ditched in favor of continental alternative really quickly. And frankly, I'm not too sure that that prospect would be met with enthusiasm by the strategists, neither on Capitol Hill or the Pentagon - and most certainly not the White House.

I think that the Chinese interpretation of "crisis" is more healthy here; NATO simply can't survive on its old, Cold War foundations. We live in a new, multi-polar world where diplomacy, commerce and consensus-seeking compromise efforts carry the day. The role of NATO can't be more than a supporting one; not a forward-based instrument as the traditional "pointed end" of foreign policy by other means. Looking at the current tragedy in Myanmar, for example, I think an intelligent manager of the enormous asset that is NATO would use its "humanitarian logistics" potential to its fullest use.

No doubt, the strategic effect and projection of such a new primary but equally forward-based role will have a tremendous positive impact. And it needn't be incompatible with the quintessential function of a communal defense force, either; it's just a matter of re-shifting accents - and that takes political will and intelligence. In any case, not a brash and blunt submission of NATO as the contemporary equivalent of the Roman foreign legions. Those days are really, really over now.

That "question of where 'economy of scale' leaves off and 'let the Yanks do it - they are already and we can get it when we need it'" almost answers itself in analogy to the fundamental cause for the rift: "national interest". NATO is losing its appeal to a growing number of people in the US (no matter whether there's intrinsic reason to reevaluate) because they look at the bottom line. Unsurprisingly, the perspective from the other side of the Atlantic yields the same conclusion to such a myopic approach.

Again, I'm not advocating for doing away with NATO (in fact, quite the contrary) but I do believe that unless the optic under which the Alliance is valued / assessed changes, and with it the key criteria that run the organization itself, it's running on a highway to extinction.

As to "rephrasing" the analysis of the whole Iraq adventure (especially its management, or lack thereof), I can afford the luxury to not be diplomatic as I'm merely attempting to convey a viewpoint. Again, the bottom line remains the same - it is quite obvious that it doesn't "play well" in the US, if only measured alongside the rather opposite electoral assessments in, say, 2004. I can go along quite a while in accepting what I basically consider misplaced pride as a factor, but that doesn't necessarily justify a fundamental, collective concession (i.e., by "Europe") to that circumstance.

Finally, I merely mentioned the Dutch specifically, as their commitment rated to population is by all means considerable. I don't think one can read anything in that mention whatsoever toward "therefore exempting" the rest of NATO. On the other hand, if one discounts the Germans' overarching reservations toward the US' handling (focus, orchestration - the works) of the so-called GWOT (which I think is pretty much a sham!) as prone to deserving a sense of "shame", it denies existing similar profound reservations in other larger European countries.

Perhaps it's useful to evoke that shameful image of a (misguided) Colin Powell's show which, strangely, seemed to have been recognized at the time anywhere in the world but in the US itself. General Clark's list of seven countries is another reminder that there's ample reason to suspect that there's more to European reservation about this so-called war on terror, than facile self-exculpatory affixing of labels such as "laziness" or a masochistic tendency toward attracting shaming scorn might mask.

If support within the US for a more serious engagement of the dire (and yet deteriorating) situation in the country that was the virtual birthplace of the horrendous atrocities of 9/11 can't seem to garner much strength, why expect so much more effort from Europeans who have their own peculiar concerns over imported hyperterrorism inside their own territory? Perhaps it's more suitable in that context to revisit the definition of "realism", before resorting to disqualification from a safe distance.