"Stephen Walt argues in a recent book, a future generation of U.S. leaders would have to send them right back. They can stay as a preventative or return as a corrective; either way, it is our fate to remain a European power."

Joerg, to these assertions, you ask whether the central assertion is "true". First, that is unknowable. However, the fact that it is asserted by no less than Walt, who I believe is a Professor in Harvard's Kennedy School, is, hmmmm, interesting; no? I don't think Walt has the reputation of being a dreaded "neocon" or imperialist running dog of the Zionist conspiracy. So, where do you think he and Mitchell are coming from? Zyme attributes it to "insolence", because he no doubt knows them both so well personally - apart from their presumed citizenship, that is. What else could possibly explain it?

Zyme, responds to this presumed insolence with a hearty harrumph and back of the hand with his version of "Yankee go home". (Yawn) To which, I'd like to know the answer to this, Zyme, "Why?" Because y'all don't like us? (Yawn) You have to do better than that.

This is a discussion group, devoted to transatlantic affairs. The starting point ought to be some understanding of the motives of the parties. Zyme's reaction is perfectly stated and understandable. So, what is the motivation for the US to permanently station forces in Europe and throughout the world all these years, why the sudden zest for all the "foreign entanglements" - particularly after resisting this temptation, for the better part of its 232 years of existence?

To make a long story short: American belief in its inherent "exceptionalism" has a history that stretches back to the founding of the republic and beyond. But, one of the unappreciated and underrated corollaries of this is a healthy skepticism and lack of trust in most, if not all, of the rest of the world. Yes, that means you too Zyme. :)

Now look at the history of the 20th century through the eyes of, say, Dwight Eisenhower. What does he see? He sees a country whose starting position for each of the two great catastrophes of the century was to stand aloof but whose finishing position in each case was a bit different. After 1.3+ million casualties of which 500k+ were deaths - admittedly much less than many others involved but a hell of a lot for country that twice thought two oceans were a sufficient buffer - he might be determined that this would not be repeated.

"Fool me once shame on you, fool me twice, shame on me", goes the old saying. And so it was that the views of foreign policy conservatives in the US became less convincing after 1945 and men like Eisenhower, Truman, Acheson and all the others put in place structures, now grown old and taken for granted, that in their day were as much about guaranteeing that there would be no third time, and that the fences were to be set far beyond the surrounding seas. The men who fought in one or both of the century's catastrophes governed US foreign policy up until the most recent times. Walt was born in 1955 - one generation removed only and a generation now waxing ascendant - and he clearly feels in his bones what motivated the generation before; he's far from alone.

American forces aren't going home from Europe now because some Europeans don't like their presence. I expect them to leave any country when asked. However, they won't leave before that request comes unless and until people like Walt and Mitchell, and the many like them, are convinced that the chance of there being a third time is exceedingly small; and the reason that the request hasn't been made, I suspect, is that those who actually have responsibility in European governments, over the years, are not yet convinced that such a guarantee is possible.

Like you, I haven't much to say about fate, but circumstances surely have changed. Those are being processed by all concerned. Instituions evolve more slowly than thinking. Certain structural changes are only now taking place in the General Staff of the US Army that reflect the new post-Soviet realities; and that in response 9/11 and Iraq.

Mitchell statement, while being "poetic", I take to mean that he doesn't see the near certainty I alluded to arising in his view anytime soon.

Thanks for the link. Believe it or not, I've not seen films like the US Army orientation film queued up first at the link. Interesting.

Sure, as I first wrote, the reaction you initially expressed is quite understandable, not only as a German but even moreso as one, I take, to be a member of much younger generation. Old people and their memories suck, don't they? ;)

Good questions about the first catastrophe, Zyme. Jacques Barzun in his magnum opus, "From Dawn to Decadence" makes the fair point that despite the horrific numbers of dead after the second catastrophe, it was the first that was the worst because it murdered a civilization and that we've been paying the price ever since.

US interest in support of NATO is manifest based on US actions over the last 17 years, despite the changes you note here, below, and in many past posts. The role of NATO is evolving, quite obviously, it has always had a political as well as military component. By its actions, the US has asserted a priority of the political over the military components during this time. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union the military component has become a handmaiden to the overtly political goals surrounding NATO enlargement. NATO and the EU are being used to reshape the political map of Europe in a manner that fits with the long term security needs of the US vis a vis Europe.

It's a cold, hard, calculus which seems to take into account the imbalances you've cited: Washington still finds NATO's utility outweighs the annoyances you've noted. Will that change? I doubt it, but then anything can change, and I'm no better at predictions than most. However, there's one thing the past 60+ years shows to be true, and it's this: The US will stand the cost if it feels the need. Recognition of and belief in a need is manifest in the words of men like Walt and Mitchell. If anything, this has been punctuated with an exclamation point with signing of the US-Polish missile defense agreement, together with Tusk's suggestion of an agreed upon bilateral security commitment apart from NATO structures. The US is very long way from the point at which it is about to "bring the troops home". The fence will remain in Europe. That's how I read it.

Joe: It can't be said often enough, despite the triteness of it, that the US and western Europe, in particular, have drawn quite different lessons from the history of the 20th century. Or, maybe I should say that they've come focus on different lessons to be learned from the previous century. Each is understandable and understood by the people who've come to occupy positions with real responsibility and authority in all the governments over the years, but how to respond and accomodate has proven, at times, a bit difficult.

Joerg: I've put your question of provenance for the phrase "European Power" in the context of describing the US before a historian friend of mine who has specialized in US military-diplomatic history for the WWII years and after. Let's see what he has to say.

(Somewhat) short answers:

1. Do I think that the US maintains a large troop presence in Europe (elsewhere as well, for that matter) as a preventative? Yes, and for reasons already stated. Another pertinent old(ish) saying is this: "I want to be there for the takeoff and not just for the landing".

2. Do I think that a withdrawal of US troops from Europe would lead to a situation that forces America to return to Europe as a "corrective"? Probably, hopefully . . . really hopefully, "No". But you get the idea.

Actually, a more relevant example might be this: Assuming that the US remained in NATO, if US forces had departed Europe, I don't think the history of US involvement in the recent Balkans flareups would have been substantially different, and that would then have involved a return to Europe, broadly speaking, as a corrective. However, you would be exactly right to describe it as an involvement in pursuit of national interest.