Thanks for your comments, Chris.

Yes, the force deployments in Japan and South Korea have been under review in terms of numbers and base positioning. My point was not that these troop positions aren't targets for a draw-down, but rather should be reflected upon when talking about 'exit strategies'. I'm actually now thinking of doing a special post on the forces in Japan and South Korea, and what the predominant thinking is in approach to the region. It would be interesting for The Atlantic Review to touch upon the forces and bases in Germany and clear up for many of us just to what level Germany is and isn't working with the U.S. My feeling is that it is doing more than most of us hear...

I definitely believe a draw down in Iraq is inevitable, and I also believe that the military will by now have drawn up several scenarios from which to pull as events develop (at least, that's my hope). I doubt highly this would be a 'down-to-zero' draw down when considering the entire War on Terror strategy--it just doesn't make sense. However, I also think that doesn't mean the Iraqis will not at some point demand zero presence.

As for your bloody mess comment, I could report on every murder, rape and kidnapping in a city such as Chicago or New Orleans and someone unfamiliar with the city would be scared shitless to go there. However, would that kind of reporting justify calling Chicago a bloody mess, nonetheless the entire state of Illinois? A rhetorical question, but I believe my point can be understood. Yes, Baghdad and the Euphrates Valley are currently the primary focus of violence and intimidation and they are being dealt with in a systematic and lop-sided nature by our forces as the spearhead. Specific events could be labeled a bloody mess and still be an understatement. But to lable the entire Iraqi condition 'at the best, a bloody mess' is void of meaning.

Yeah, I would say my Chicago analogy was a little oversimplified.

The difficult thing about making comparisons with Iraq is that it is an unprecedented undertaking. Specific examples from history never fit completely and so in the end, we are all speculators shooting from the hip.

I understand better now that your bloody mess comment was not limited to physical violence in Iraq, but also the various political complications and power influences. I guess in the end, like with the USA, there is no guarantee that a constitution, etc. will put away possibilities for things like civil war. We just have to believe that the best of people in the world will overcome the worst and move forward supporting the former.

Thank you for the link Wolf. I do believe that there are definately some fluctuations in the capability of Iraqi forces that should be of concern. But I think these fluctuations are natural with conflict, and in a long-term view, as long as they aren't full force degrading, should be seen as not problematic at the strategic level. The article you linked, unfortunately, didn't quote fully the upgrade in Iraqi force assessment standards that makes it appear the force is less effective when in reality the higher standards automatically reduce the operating level of most Iraqi battalions.

"Quizzed by reporters about the readiness status of Iraqi forces, Casey said he's confident that they're progressing on track.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld urged reporters not to get caught up in evaluating that readiness based on numerical status levels that fluctuate based on a variety of factors, including measuring procedures.

For example, initial readiness standards two years ago measured numbers of Iraqi troops. Later, those standards were based on the number of trained troops. Later yet, those standards were based on troops who were trained and equipped. As the bar continued to rise, the numbers dipped a bit, giving an impression that readiness was declining, the secretary explained.

"Well, the numbers have moved around, and it looks like we're getting worse," Rumsfeld said. "We're not getting worse, we're getting better. Every single day, the Iraqi security forces are getting bigger and better and better trained and better equipped and more experienced."

So, like with any organization, if you raise the standards for performance, the appearance of current performance will seem to have dropped significantly in the short-term until you begin to bring the entire organization up to the new level.

Personally, I doubt this could be the entire reason for a reduction in readiness assessment of the Iraqi forces, but I wouldn't go so far as to say this is "bad news." Rather, it is simply reality for a conflict situation and part of a rebuilding process that continues to move forward.

Here is the link that provides the above quote:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/20050930_2901.html

Also, you can find the full, unedited press conference in video here:

http://www.c-span.org/videoarchives.asp?CatCodePairs=,&ArchiveDays=100

Although the first link above is obviously military news and biased, I would argue the AP account is as well. Combined with the actual, unedited video, we can put both accounts of the press conference in context.

Enjoy your site,

Shawn

I just found a great post in the link below covering a speech by General Patraeus at Princeton:


http://tigerhawk.blogspot.com/2005/10/lt-gen-david-petraeus-speaks-at.html


It clearly clarifies the downgrade of the 2 battalions as a matter of "personnel changes" which kind of supports my idea of "moving assessment" that captures such changes and adjusts status levels accordingly.

The post also has lots of other great info on status level metrics!