QUESTION: Do you agree with Mr. Allawi that Iraq has fallen into civil war?
THE PRESIDENT: I do not. There are other voices coming out of Iraq, by the way, other than Mr. Allawi -- who I know, by the way; like; he's a good fellow. […]
QUESTION: […] Do you feel that personally you have ever gotten bad advice on the conduct of the war in Iraq? And do you believe Rumsfeld should resign?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't believe he should resign. I think he's done a fine job of not only conducting two battles, Afghanistan and Iraq, but also transforming our military, which has been a very difficult job inside the Pentagon. Listen, every war plan looks good on paper until you meet the enemy, not just the war plan we executed in Iraq but the war plans that have been executed throughout the history of warfare.
QUESTION: Just after the 2004 election, […] you claimed a really enviable balance of political capital and a strong mandate. Would you make that claim today; that you still have that?
THE PRESIDENT: I'd say I'm spending that capital on the war.
QUESTION: Mr. President, you've spoken about Iraq being a beacon for democracy throughout the Middle East. Yet, we've had troubles in Iraq and we've seen aggressiveness from Syria and Iran. Are you concerned that the Iraq experience is going to embolden authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and make it tougher to get democracy there?
THE PRESIDENT: There's no question that if we were to prematurely withdraw and the march to democracy were to fail, the Al Qaida would be emboldened. Terrorists groups would be emboldened. The Islamo-fascists would be emboldened. No question about that.
QUESTION: Will there come a day -- and I'm not asking you when; I'm not asking for a timetable -- will there come a day when there will be no more American forces in Iraq?
THE PRESIDENT: That, of course, is an objective. And that will be decided by future presidents and future governments of Iraq.

When it comes to DPT [Democratic Peace Theory], the Middle East has become a laboratory with Iraq serving as a test tube for the experiment. And it’s a test that seems to be failing. […] In a way, neoconservative foreign policy is bursting with explosive self-contradiction. It urges Washington to use its military power to establish a hegemonic position in the Middle East, while at the same time it calls for holding free elections that empower forces opposed to the American hegemon and its allies. In Turkey, South Korea, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia, free voting has resulted in the election of political parties that are less than enthusiastic about American’s goals. [In the Middle East,] a process that challenges the current authoritarian regimes and permits free elections gives rise to illiberal regimes and makes the region safe not for liberal democracy but for nationalism and other combative forms of identity.

The author also quotes professors Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, who in their recent book Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Amazon.de, Amazon.com), as well as in a recent article for The National Interest, analyze many historic examples to argue that “early stages of transitions to electoral politics have often been rife with violence”, and that democratic transition can indeed become a potent cause of war:

Without a coherent state grounded in a consensus on which citizens will exercise self-determination, unfettered electoral politics often gives rise to nationalism and violence at home and abroad. […] When authoritarian regimes collapse and countries begin the process of democratization, politicians of all stripes have an incentive to play the nationalist card. […] The nationalist and ethnic politics that prevails in many newly democratizing states loads the dice in favor of international and civil war. […] In all of these varied settings, the turbulent beginning phase of democratization contributed to violence in states with weak political institutions. Statistical studies show that countries with weak institutions undergoing an incomplete democratic transition are more than four times as likely to become involved in international wars than other states, and that incomplete democracies are more likely to experience civil wars than either pure autocracies or fully consolidated democracies.

A successful long-term project for promoting democracy globally by inducement would require the United States and Europe to work together. Separately, each has liabilities. […] Acting together, the United States and the EU would have adequate resources and political legitimacy to mount a program of encouraging preparations for democracy worldwide.