An orangutan is holding his first solo exhibition of his paintings in a zoo in Germany. Like many artists, he knows the therapeutic value of art: He took up painting after his partner died.

Many senior defense officials are concerned that the plan to cut by nearly half the number of forces in Europe could make it difficult to support American interests in the European theater. The troop reductions, they say, go too far.
"I am very apprehensive about how low we are taking capabilities of the US Army in Europe," says one senior defense official in Europe, who asked for anonymity because of the sensitivity of the ongoing discussions.
For years, the presence of more than 110,000 US troops at big, established bases in places like Germany and Italy has been seen as a cold-war relic. In 2002, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld oversaw an initiative to reduce the American military footprint in Western Europe in favor of smaller, more agile forces at temporary bases in places like Romania and Bulgaria. That would put US forces in far less stable areas and make them far more relevant.
Under the plan unveiled in 2005, many of the extra forces are to be returned to the United States. By 2012, only about 60,000 US personnel would remain in Europe.
But that was so two years ago. Today, those assumptions may not hold. Russia's democratic reforms have moved in reverse, and Iran has emerged as a potentially serious threat. In addition, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have lasted longer than expected, which has tapped American forces based in Europe who would otherwise be engaged in European Command missions such as building "partner nation" capacities. That has made it difficult for European Command to pursue a new, more active strategy with these nations and potentially prevent problems before they occur. Indeed, exercises and other military engagements across Europe and in Africa have had to be canceled because the command has or will have fewer troops. (...)
There is another problem of a more practical nature: The forces the Army is returning to the US don't have a place to go. Congress has only partially funded the Base Realignment and Closure Act, which governs a series of base closings and consolidation.

Despite his affinity for German culture, Janssen has hardly been welcomed with open arms. "I don't like having to play diplomat here," he complains. Many of the roughly 3,200 US students enrolled in foreign study programs in Germany share Janssen's experience. They are reluctant ambassadors, routinely taken to task by students and even complete strangers for the perceived offences of their government at home -- an affront that visiting students and academics from China, Russia and Arab countries rarely encounter.

US Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey had recently paid a visit in person to German banks and other companies to persuade them to stop doing business with Tehran and was successful in making his case to Deutsche Bank. (...)
According to Der Spiegel, the Iranian government has channeled some of its foreign currency earnings to German banks. The total held by German financial institutions topped 6.55 billion euros ($8.9 billion dollars).(...)
The Securities and Exchange Commission list stated that Siemens has business dealings with all five named "sponsors of terrorism" while BASF is linked solely with Iran. Deutsche Bank has connections with both Iran and Sudan.

The crowd formed on the sand the letters of the phrase: “FRANCE WILL NEVER FORGET”, aimed at honoring the fallen American heroes who scarified their lives to liberate France at the end of WW II.

Though the necessity of a military component in Afghanistan remains undisputed, both operations [ISAF and OEF] now seem increasingly incompatible. The [OEF] mandate’s legitimacy is in question: how long does the right of self-defense remain legitimate? The affiliation of ISAF and OEF-troops is becoming increasingly ambiguous, and not only for the Afghan population. Reports of uncoordinated military action among troops in Afghanistan are on the rise, and the coordination of command between the two operations is growing more difficult.

If Germany expects US help in the future, it must stay the course in Afghanistan now. The Bundeswehr should carry its share of the coalition burden without complaint as part of OEF. (...)
Americans are just becoming aware of the growing movement in Germany to pull away from Afghanistan, and they are just beginning to be angered by it. With time it will anger the United States Government as well.

Our defeat in Vietnam and the subsequent isolationist sentiment made it easier for the Soviets to decide to take the risk [to invade Afghanistan]. Without engaging in historical determinism, it’s fair to say that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan set in motion a chain of events that culminated in 9/11. In the minds of bin Laden and his compatriots, the jihadists had defeated one of the world’s two superpowers and were responsible for its collapse. (...)
Bush has been roundly and soundly criticized for ignoring and misjudging the consequences of invading Iraq. That being the case, isn’t it equally important to assess — not sweep under the rug — the consequences of defeat in Iraq?