Ah you are talking about a conflict of two concepts I favor?
So you mean one cannot publicly cooperate with the Russians on so many areas while also wanting to gain more influence on the countries in between?

This is a good observation. Don´t misunderstand me - if I was in a situation where diplomacy was obligatory, I would never say many things the way I do here.

If you are referring to the general conflict of both policies, I can only offer you one point in favor of the conflict: Those contradictory policies can be played off against each other. So for example when Russia wants more cooperation with Germany, politicians from the SPD (like Steinmeier today in Russia) will be pleased to enhance our partnership. And when the countries in between want patronage, our conservatives will be as pleased to fulfill that role.

Effectively a decision between both policies can be postponed this way. I would not consider this a bad thing - isn´t creating and upkeeping options a major goal of diplomacy? :)

That is why I believe that the foundation of Euregios is our only chance to losen the rigidity of german-polish borders. By founding border-crossing regions which often orientate at historical regions that neglect the current borders we are able to influence the neighboring regions across the border and draw them closer to our side.

But apart from that I see little chances for significant direct german influence on Poland. The only positive part is that the Poles have little choice. The French are oriented more to the mediterranean realm, the British foreign policy is paying most attention to issues abroad Europe. So it would be interesting to find out whether either Russians or Germans are more popular in Poland.

Ok we will all agree here that the military plays a bigger role in the term "world power" than the average german participant believes. But for a realistic picture of the future, you would also have to include the military potential in terms of current state of technology and industrial infrastructure.

Now if you look at these, you will have to acknowledge that we have rightly not spended our precious money on a huge amount of troops but instead on constantly modernizing our weaponry. This means in case a potential enemy arises, we will not be forced to spend years on research while fighting against a superior force, we would only have to adjust our industries and keep our equipment up to date.

As regards our infrastructure, aside from Japan which country would have an easier time replacing automobiles with tanks at the end of the assembly line? Especially if you consider that Germany is the world´s leading producer of quality machinery. Furthermore our transport infrastructure allows us to create new chains of production facilities more quickly than anywhere else.

In 1933 more than a decade of military research had pulled ahead Germany, the transport and production infrastructure were inhibited by the effects of the Treaty of Versailles - today we are lacking none of this.

"It has *everything* to do with maintaining a profitable export market for Germany military technology."

I will not deny the fact that our export industry is also involved heavily. So? It is a vital industry and therefor gets the support of our government. More revenue for our arms industries means more money available for their research, which in turn allows us to remain at the edge of the development. I would call this a win-win situation. And as an american, you can hardly claim that this isn´t exactly the policy of the US government.

"For example, short of an actual invasion, it is hard to imagine the German unions permitting the kind of work rule changes that permitted the US to transform its auto industry so rapidly in WW II."

Your argument makes no sense as it combines two different possibilities that exclude each other: Either there is a vital threat to a country´s security, which will turn all unions powerless and instead favor the government. Or there is no vital threat, which means you will hardly need to use industry branches like the auto industry for a hurried production.

"I seem to recall, your new submarine was designed specifically to limit it to coastal defense, even though the technology could have had some interesting applications in blue water...."

In this case, you have either heard the last news a long time ago, or you don´t recall correctly.

You can update your info here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_212_submarine

"Between Gulf War I and Gulf War II, the US re-wrote our entire doctrine of tactical air-to-surface bombing and infantry support, so that the percentage of "smart bombs" went from under 8% (a special-purpose tactic) to something like 70% (a general-purpose tactic). This required almost no additional R&D, but required major changes to training and logistics, plus changes to the supporting industries."

I cannot find any percentages on how many guided air-ground missiles are currently used in our airforce. The latest introductions though seem to point in the same direction. For example you may want to read this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taurus_missile

@ John

Well without spending much money into the arms industry, it will lose its position in the research category. So it isn´t a real bogus in my opinion.

"The topic was not whether Germany can provide for its own defense, it was whether Germany can become a world power. That would require projecting power on some level, and responding in some way to threats other than invasion. Which could be done by actually building a larger military with expeditionary capabilities, over a decade or so. It cannot be done by keeping your technology up to date and then switching from commercial to military production quickly as the need emerges."

Ok that is a point I agree with. Certainly a bigger scale military is needed for that. Also we are only at the beginning of upgrading our operational radius. In the latest strategical white book, which usually guides the direction of the development for a decade, a world wide operable force is specifically demanded. And once something is cast in laws and rules here, the political struggle is basically over, as the military circles can scotch any discussion by simply referring to the white book, which was passed by our biggest parties.

The so called Transformation (this is the literal official state our army is described in) will take its time, due to the lack of a immediate threat. But interests abroad Europe have been specifically included in our strategy. You might guess which these are for a country like Germany: Safeguarding the trade routes, especially the sources of vital raw materials needed for our industries. So the kind of operation to secure order in a country with important mines like in Congo we saw in 2006 will probably not be the last one.

As regards guided missiles, one can hardly imagine that unguided are used in a considerable amount due to a specific reason: We are lacking a genuine bomber fleet. With the so called Jagdbomber, in our Luftwaffe multi-role jet-fighters are to fill that gap. With their limited space for bombs, they practically only use guided missiles (in the past american ones, now replacing them with german products) for pinpoint strikes. And this has been the strategy for decades.

"But, the typical Bundeswehr unit hasn't undergone this revolution, nor has the Bundeswehr built the C3I (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C4ISTAR)"

The article wasn´t very detailed so I am somewhat confused about this development. In case it is used for real-time communication between different units and the headquarters, I can assure you that the same is being introduced here, going as far as providing a communication unit on every rifle a soldier carries.
The only english article I could find about it is this one:

http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/81720

Can you read german? In this case I could provide you with detailed articles.


@ Pat

"Which unfortunately does reveal that the Type 212a is indeed for coastal protection, it's range is 8,000km but unlike a nuclear powered ship it must be replenished and that means a trip back to Wilhemshaven or the remote possibility that one of the Berlin-class replenishment ships is available."

You know this is funny, just a few weeks ago I wondered about the same point at a similar discussion here. So I simply mailed our defense ministry and asked whether it wouldn´t be useful to found a naval base along the african coast line for refuel. Their response was that this is not needed currently, as a "ship agent" can arrange a secure docking in any harbour of most countries. So I assume there are bilateral treaties which secure this way.

This very critical article is a sign of that assumption: http://www.algeria-watch.org/de/artikel/2007/todesmaschine_aktivierbar.htm

It basically describes the stopovers of german submarines and frigates in the port of Algier between 2002 and 2007. And a possible service in return for the refueling permission is also described: German instructors are training Algerien troops. This kind of gentlemens agreement is indeed in effect with a wide range of countries.

"But again while attack subs are a necessary part of a modern navy they are relatively useless as implements of foreign policy aside from attacking shipping, escort and ASW. They cannot provide the kind of moveable air port or troop carriers that are necessary sometimes to enforce a country's will on another."

I agree here. They can hardly be used against a country lacking a considerable fleet. Their only use then would be to conduct surveillance operations and to secretly deploy or pick up special operation units.
So their full potential is only coming into effect while fighting a foe who heavily relies on maritime forces and sea trade routes. But you never know who your enemy in the future will be. Don´t you agree that considering this aspect, the commissioning of those submarines is a good measure for being prepared?


When reading the article of your link, I was first astonished to read about all the drawbacks and thought about recent introductions that were meant to specifically adress these issues. Then I thought how could all these introductions have failed? The article cannot shed any light on this however, because it cannot have incorporated these measurements. This became clear when as defense minister, Scharping was cited as the current one. But Scharping was in office from 1998 to 2002. And the report must also have been published before 2002, since costs are still calculated in D-Mark. The Euro however was introduced at Jan 1st in 2002.

The only part of the report I would still consider up to date is the following: The controversy about an abolition of the conscription service. This has not been solved even today, instead the discussion has simply become abandoned.

Especially the funding projection is incorrect. Probably due to all the foreign operations, it has not been reduced but instead has been increased considerably. A number of huge projects have been initiated, costing hundreds of millions or even billions of Euros that have not been considered at the time of this report.

So I am sorry to say, but the report is mostly outdated.

"What if the opponent rents them before you do? I wish my defense ministry had such a sense of humor."

*lol* good point. A world-wide operable force is of course preferable, but I consider this tactic to be a good interim solution. You cannot go from 0 to 100% in a matter of months, especially when it involves the commissioning of naval forces.
Maybe putting your expectations into the proper perspective helps: From 1945 on world wide operations have been out of the question for our military for almost six decades. I would say we already have gone a long way in regaining our former freedom of action. You should be more patient in this regard. I am not disappointed by the current efforts. In fact I consider our current development in a state one could not have imagined just a decade ago. Expecting a transformation at an even higher speed level would be utopian.


"Tut mir leid, ich lese keine deutschen (blame Google translator)

Traurig, lese ich nicht Deutschen (blame Altavista's babelfish)


Sorry, I do not read German. I am curious, are either of these translations correct? Is one less incorrect than the other?"

One cannot translate "to read" literally here. Instead, you will have to use the german word for "to understand" which is "verstehen".

So you could say "Tut mir leid, ich verstehe kein Deutsch."

What you could translate literally is the word "to speak", which means "sprechen" in german.

This would then sound something like "Tut mir leid, ich spreche kein Deutsch."

I cannot judge whether this can produce interest for someone who doesn´t (yet) speak german. But I would not bet on it!

:)