As an era ends, Iraqis will grapple with their own security while veterans will adjust to the labor market back at home, argues Caitlin Howarth in this guest article:

On Monday, President Obama gave a joint appearance with Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to mark the final withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. In announcing the holiday homecoming, the president has made good on his promise to bring the war to an end. For thousands of families welcoming their loved ones home, it is a time for joy; for the country, it is a time for gratitude.

Now is also a time for healing. Both the people of Iraq and U.S. veterans have wounds to heal and relationships to rebuild. The veterans come home to a still-struggling economy, limited jobs, and complex health issues. Iraqis are still picking up the pieces of an infrastructure shattered by war and complicated by sectarian tension; living in the midst of regional upheaval presents no easy road, either. Five years ago, when I studied the smaller pockets of Iraq's sectarian violence, the ugliness of what can happen in a power vacuum appeared overwhelming. The reality of what happens when some people have plenty of weapons and no accountability remains a major concern - and not just among Iraqis.

Guest article by Professor Stefan Wolff from the University of Nottingham 

(1) If Gaddafi supporters in/outside the regime did not fight, where are they and what are their plans?

Resistance collapsed relatively quickly on the road to, and in, Tripoli, but that does not mean that the regime as a whole and across the country has been comprehensively defeated. The rebels clearly have the upper hand now and momentum is on their side, but there is a danger of setbacks.

Looking at the most recent, and most traumatic, transitions of a similar kind, in both Iraq and Afghanistan regime loyalists of varying kinds resurfaced. In Iraq, they were partly defeated and partly co-opted after a very violent civil war drawing in significant foreign forces; in Afghanistan this process is still far from resolved. Both cases also demonstrate that al-Qaeda and its upshots are very adept at exploiting the instability that usually follows violent regime collapse, if only to establish (temporary) alliances of convenience to further their own agenda.

The Atlantic Review strives to be the center for news analysis and thoughtful online discussions on contemporary transatlantic relations issues ranging from defense to economics and culture.

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Atlantic Review was founded in 2003 by three US and German Fulbright Alumni who were concerned about the deterioration of the US-German relationship. However, Atlantic Review now covers not only US-German relations, but aims for the whole spectrum of transatlantic relations issues. Atlantic Review is currently edited by Joerg Wolf (Berlin, Germany) and Kyle Atwell (Half Moon Bay, CA).

Joerg Wolf founded Atlantic Review with the US and German Fulbrighters Scott Brunstetter and Joerg Geier in July 2003. Joerg Wolf works as project manager and Editor-in-Chief of the Atlantic Community, the open think tank on global issues, published by the Atlantic Initiative e.V. in Berlin. Joerg studied political science at the Free University of Berlin and worked as a research associate for the International Risk Policy project at the Free University's Center for Transatlantic Foreign and Security Policy. He has been a Fulbright Fellow at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and Washington DC and has worked for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Cairo and in Berlin.

Kyle Atwell joined the Atlantic Review in November 2007. Originally from California, his interest in transatlantic relations focuses on defense. Currently, Kyle is an infantry officer serving in the United States Army. Previously Kyle has worked for NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the European Union Office of the Municipality of Prato, Italy, and studied transatlantic security relations at Lund University in Sweden. He has also served as Executive Editor of the International Affairs Journal at UC Davis, worked for an arms control NGO in Washington D.C., and as a Field Representative for a California state legislator. Kyle studied Economics and International Relations at the University of California, Davis, graduating with Highest Honors and as a member of Phi Beta Kappa.

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Guest post by Joe Joe Noory is an Architect, investor, and independent observer of news and opinion:

Somewhere between the emotional populism of wanting to burden the higher performing European states with guilt over resisting to bail out the Greek government, and the risk investors are being offered to take are the hard truths of bailing out of the broke Greek government by investing in their bonds: they might not just default on ?8,5 billion in obligations to bond purchasers due on 19 May, but run the risk of never being paid back for future bond offerings (of perhaps two years or less), much in the way depositors in an uninsured failed bank will never see a red pfennig of their invested savings on a default.

Ifo's Hand-Werner Sinn indicated that very same sentiment on Wednesday morning, according to this wire piece:

The warning came as a new poll showed nearly two-thirds of Germans were opposed to helping Greece, with a majority believing that membership of the EU brought more disadvantages than advantages. Asked on MDR radio if Berlin would ever get its money back, Sinn, who heads the Ifo institute and is one of the top economic advisers to the government, said: "To tell you the truth, no."
Greece "will not be in a position to carry out the necessary budgetary rigour" and will eventually have "to ask for Germany to waive the debt," he said.
He warned that bailing out Greece could set a precedent for other euro area countries labouring under high debt and public deficits. "It would be understandable if the Italians or the Spanish put pressure on us to pay up now because it is an important precedent for them," said Sinn.

Before you react, take the statement for what it is: a warning. It isn't a characterization of the ur-Greek citizen, or a nationalistic reflection, or a cultural issue, but a warning that the discipline to raise revenue and cut budgets in face of the street protests and strikes of civil servants and dependants on entitlements. It isn't a characterization of what they did, but a warning of future events, one which prices them and tells us what something is really worth, just as watching those who short an equity or commodity does.

Atlantic Review appreciates that two Wall Street Journal contributors respond to our blog post on their article.

George Pieler and Jens Laurson took issue with the French finance minister's claim that German productivity ails Europe's economy. Joerg Wolf agreed with their criticism in Atlantic Review's post Germany as Maya the Bee, but expressed disagreement on the issue of tax cuts, even though that was not a central part of their article.

Jens Laurson and George Pieler have now submitted the following riposte, which we appreciate and are happy to post here:

In commenting on our Wall Street Journal piece ("Not so Faaaaast, Germany"), Joerg Wolf, Editor of the Atlantic Review, disagrees with the following observation: "Germany should cut taxes.  But it should do so for its own good..."

Mr. Wolf makes three points which we should like to examine; hoping to clarify an evident misunderstanding that has arisen.

Mr. Wolf says Germany has been advised to cut taxes "especially of top earners, over the past twenty years.  Such advice is neither helpful nor original and creative."  Well, neither originality nor creativity was our intent, nor is that an argument against the argument. The question is, whether it is good advice. Certainly if it is such oft-repeated advice there must be something to it?  For the record, we think cutting taxes is good-indeed essential-advice. This is partly because Germany has one of the highest top personal tax rates in world (47%). More worryingly, the German state absorbs nearly half the nation's GDP which means an astonishing, if hidden loss of productivity.  This formula has worked for Germany so far, a reflection of popular acceptance of high taxes in exchange for government-guaranteed income security programs.  We don't think that will work so well in the future, though. The German tax cuts over the last two decades Mr. Wolf mentions, in any case far outweighed by the tax increases in the same time, are irrelevant to this discussion.

The Atlantic Review is pleased to present this guest article by Dr. Shanthie Mariet D'Souza of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India.

President Barack Obama’s ‘new strategy on Afghanistan’, unveiled on December 1 at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, linking additional troop deployment to a timetable of drawdown of forces and narrowly defined goals, misses out on the core essentials of counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns which hinges on time, long-term commitment, institution building and larger political strategy. Ultimately, COIN campaigns are won in the political domain, where military is only one of the many essential elements to achieve the long-term solution.

As the debate on the troop surge raged in the United States following the controversial Afghan presidential elections and waning domestic support for the Afghan war, President Obama announced his decision to send 30,000 troops within the first half of 2010, nearly acceding to his top military commander General McChrystal’s request for an additional 40,000. President Obama banking on his approach of ‘multilateralism and diplomacy’ has requested NATO allies to pitch in another 10,000 troops. So far NATO appears to have managed to garner support for another 7,000. Combined with NATO troops, the top US Gen. McChrystal would eventually get the required number of 40,000. The amount spent on Afghan war will increase from an estimated $130 billion in fiscal 2010 to $160 billion.

With increased troop levels, Gen. McChrystal had promised to turn the tide of the Taliban momentum in 12 months. By adopting a ‘population-centric’ COIN strategy of ‘clear, hold, build and transfer’, the additional troop could help in ‘clearing and holding’ insurgency afflicted areas in the south and east. However, with focus of troop deployment being the South and the East, concerns abound regarding the stability of Afghanistan’s North and the West. The Taliban insurgency which works through various networks has the capacity to cause instability in these regions, as witnessed recently in Kapisa, Kanduz and Baglan. More importantly, the COIN strategy does not look at new measures of cutting the symbiotic nexus and sources of funding of the various strands of Taliban insurgency which is a huge motley of various anti government groups, followers of Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s radical group Hizb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, Al Qaeda and its affiliates, religious clerics, narcotic traffickers, bandits and tribal fighters in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. For instance, the Haqqani network, operating in Khost, Paktia, Paktika, and North Waziristan has now extended its activities to Ghazni, Logar and Wardak provinces.

This post is from Andrew Zvirzdin, who used to be a guest blogger, but now joins Atlantic Review as part of the team. Andrew is originally from upstate New York and is currently finishing his second year of grad school at the Maxwell School in Syracuse

After the implosion of the Dubai miracle in the desert, investors are nervously looking elsewhere for the next debt debacle. No small wonder that the focus has turned to European countries with high debt loads such as Greece and Italy. Top European monetary gurus have been quick to assure investors that no European default is likely. But these days, anyone with a big credit card bill looks suspect in international finance.

The remarkable thing is that the EU has taken a significant lead in charting the course towards global economic recovery, despite its heavy debt burden. Consider for example that Germany and France were among the first countries to escape the present recession late this summer. Their robust growth was due in part to automatic stabilizers already in place when the financial crisis hit. And the notorious-and by some estimates, beneficial-cash-for-clunkers program in the US was inspired by Germany and other European countries who already had similar but more successful programs.

Now, as Europe is fading as the American health care punching bag, the continent's ability to live with government debt is under close scrutiny. Paul Krugman has recently warned (here and here) against an excessive focus on fiscal deficits in the US, pointing to Europe as an example: "If these countries can run up debts of more than 100 percent of GDP without being destroyed by bond vigilantes, so can we." CNBC is less positive in its assessment but acknowledges that Italy's resilience despite high debt levels means there is still a "lot of debt tolerance out there."

Still, debt will remain a worry on everyone's mind for some time to come, though the Eurozone has the tools needed to weather this storm (as I have written about here and here), and the US still has its financial strength. With the US and European countries consistently ranked as among the most indebted countries in the world, both sides of the Atlantic will likely need to work together on debt-related matters. Indeed, as the eurozone has already shown, teaming up with other indebted nations makes it that much harder to be bullied around by international markets.

This is a guest post from our long-time reader and commenter John Hadjisky, who comments as "John in Michigan" on Atlantic Review

I've been thinking about how to explain the trans-Atlantic relationship to an average citizen on either side, in broad strokes. Part of the problem is a lack of common vocabulary. Here on Atlantic Review we tend to bash away at that problem using a combination of rants and highly technical analysis. I have nothing but praise for a good rant, especially one that attracts readers. But, rants have obvious problems. Technical arguments, meanwhile, at best are wonkish, and at worst are nit-picking.

Occasionally, however, we get some real gems here. So for my first official guest post, I decided to mine the archives and highlight what I like best about Atlantic Review. I hope everyone will add their own "best of" links.